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RECENT DECISIONS

Where deleterious foreign matter does not constitute a component part of the food product a plaintiff cannot rely on a breach
of the statute but may proceed on the theory of common law negligence.8 Proof that the deleterious matter was in the food at the time
of its delivery to the injured consumer and that the food was undisturbed in the same container in which it left the processor constitutes a prima facie case of negligence. 9 Also, where the food has
been distributed to the consumer from a bulk package by an intermediary party, proof that such intermediary was not negligent constitutes a prima facie case against the producer. 10 In either case
such proof if not rebutted would warrant the finder of facts in inferring negligence."'
It is submitted, therefore, that the drawing of such inference
might be a real basis for the decision in the Alphin case, particularly
since it was shown that the wire was completely concealed from the
restaurant. The court in basing its decision on a breach of Section
200 ran counter to the grain of decisional law on the subject. The
Piazza case is in accord with the precedent cases as to the application
of the statute. Further, as the plaintiff failed to prove negligence
and as there was no basis for inferring it, the judgment was rightly
given to the defendant.

To1,Ts-AssuMPTION OF RTsx.-Plaintiff purchased a ticket for
an unreserved seat in the defendant's baseball park. Upon entering

the stadium, plaintiff seated herself in the screened portion of the
stands. Told to move because all those seats were reserved, she
inquired of the usher whether the unscreened section was safe.
Reassured, she complied. Struck by a foul ball, plaintiff brought an
action to recover for injuries sustained. The complaint was dismissed as a matter of law. Held, judgment affirmed. After providing screened sections, there remains the hazard that balls fouled into
the unscreened portions may cause injury to patrons. Such danger
is inherent in the game and obvious to all. Plaintiff's lack of knowledge could not alter this fact, nor.js this hazard that type of an unreasonable risk to patrons which inposes upon the operator a duty
to warn. Anderson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 231 S. W. 2d 170
(Mo. 1950).
8

Bertha Chysky v. Drake Brothers Co., 235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576
(1923).
9

Miller v. National Bread Co., 247 App. Div.
(4th Dep't 1936); Cohen v. Dugan Brothers, Inc.
N. Y. Supp. 743 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
10 Steinberg et al. v. Bloom et at., 5 N. Y. S.
Ritchie v. Sheffield Farms Co., 129 Misc. 765, 222
Munic. Ct. 1927).
11 See note 9 supra.

88, 286 N. Y. Supp. 908
et al., 132 Misc. 896, 230

2d 774 (Sup. Ct. 1938);
N. Y. Supp. 724 (N. Y.
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The duty of an operator of a place of public amusement to his
patron is the same as that of any possessor of land to his business
invitee. 1 Reasonable care must be taken by the operator to protect
against injury which could have been reasonably foreseen and warn-2
ing of hidden perils must be given to the unsuspecting patron.
Nevertheless, the invitee at a public exhibition assumes the risk of3
an obvious danger or one that is a matter of common knowledge.
Therefore, the degree of the duty required is conditioned and adapted
to the character of the exhibition and the general notoriety it has
achieved.
Application of these general principles to the injured baseball
spectator' cases has resulted in firmly established rules of law which
clearly define the duty of a baseball exhibitor to his patrons. The
proprietor of a baseball park must provide screened seats directly
behind home plate 4 and screened exits for those desiring such accommodations. 5 This accomplished, an owner discharges his duty of
maintaining adequate safeguards against wayward balls. 6 The spectator choosing an unprotected seat, whether he is a rabid fan or a
novice,'7 assumes the risk of being struck; 8 whereas the operator is
not required to warn of a hazard so openly apparent.9
Courts have not yet established comparable rules to govern
liability for injury occurring at other sports exhibitions. Assumption

I Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, Inc., 349 Mo. 1215, 164 S. W. 2d
318 (1942); RESTATEmENT, ToRTs § 343 (1934); see Note, 142 A. L. R. 858
(1942).
2 See note 1 supra.
3 See note 1 supra.
4 Compare Curtis v. Portland Baseball Club, 130 Ore. 93, 279 Pac. 277
(1929) (150 feet of screening held sufficient as a matter of law), with Wells
v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass'n, 122 Minn. 327, 142 N. W. 706 (1913)
(whether 65 feet of screening provided proper protection ruled question of fact
for jury).
5 Olds v. St. Louis Nat. Baseball Club, 233 Mo. App. 897, 104 S. W. 2d
746 (1937).

6 Cates v. Cincinnati Exhibition Co. et al., 215 N. C. 64, 1 S. E. 2d 131
(1939); Hull v. Oklahoma City Baseball Co. et al., 196 Okla. 40, 163 P. 2d
982 (1945); Keys et al. v. Alamo City Baseball Co., 150 S. W. 2d 368 (Tex.
1941). But cf. Edling v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 181 Mo. App.
327, 168 S. W. 908 (1914) (operator held liable when ball passed through hole
in netting and struck plaintiff).
7 Ratcliff v. San Diego Baseball Club of the Pacific Coast League, 27
Cal. 8App. 2d 733, 81 P. 2d 625 (1938).
Lorino v. New Orleans Baseball & Amusement Co., 16 La. App. 95, 133
So. 408 (1931)
(during pre-game practice); Blackball v. Capitol District
Baseball Ass'n, 154 Misc. 640, 278 N. Y. Supp. 649 (City Ct. 1935), aff'd,
Blackball v. Albany Baseball & Amusement Co., 157 Misc. 801, 285 N. Y. Supp.
695 (County Ct. 1936) (while walking to unprotected seats); Hummel v.
Columbus Baseball Club, Inc., 71 Ohio App. 321, 49 N. E. 2d 773 (1943)
(at a night game as well as day).
9 Hunt v. Thomasville Baseball Co., 80 Ga. App. 572, 56 S. E. 2d 828

(1949).
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2
of risk by the patron at wrestling,10 football," and auto racing'
events is considered a question for the jury. Injuries resulting from
attendance at an ice hockey match, however, have occasioned a variance of opinion: the New York view, as in the baseball cases, is that
a spectator choosing an unprotected seat assumes the risk of being
struck by a flying puck as a matter of law; 13 other jurisdictions allow
the jury to decide whether the operator has discharged his duty to
invitees. 1 4 A recent ruling is indicative of the trend to be followed
in future decisions pertaining to these sports activities. The court,
in effect, said that when hockey has reached a plane of popularity
rivalling baseball, the rules established for the latter sport should
prevail.';
It is submitted that the law in this field is dictated by public
policy. Rulings result from a conflict of two desires: adequate
protection for the spectator; and limitation of liability upon the
owner, in order for him to provide this form of entertainment unhampered by oppressive regulations. 16 The holdings in the baseball
cases indicate that liability in many factual situations will be determined as a matter of law. If other athletic exhibitions, through the
media of attendance and television, can succeed to the national recognition accorded to baseball, it is opined that17 courts will adopt the
same rationale which is applied to that sport.

10 Dusckiewicz v. Carter, 115 Vt. 122, 52 A. 2d 788 (1947) (ringside spectator hit by wrestler thrown from ring). Bid cf. Wiersma v. City of Long

Beach, 41 Cal. App. 2d 8, 106 P. 2d 45 (1940) (no liability of owner as matter
of law when wrestler jumped from ring and struck plaintiff with chair, such
assault being beyond the scope of the wrestler's employment).
11 Ingerson et al. v. Shattuck School, 185 Minn. 16, 239 N. W. 667 (1931)
(plaintiff, familiar with game, stood close to sidelines and was injured when
a player was thrown offside).
12 Murphy v. Jarvis Chevrolet Co. et al., 310 Ill. App. 534, 34 N. E. 2d 872
(1941) (spectator at soap box derby hit by runaway auto) ; cf. Arnold v. New
York, 163 App. Div. 253, 148 N. Y. Supp. 479 (3d Dep't 1914) (racing car
skidded off track and struck invitee standing at rail).
l3 Ingersoll v. Onondaga Hockey Club, 245 App. Div. 137, 281 N. Y. Supp.
505 (3d Dep't 1935); Hammel v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 156 Misc.
311, 279 N. Y. Supp. 815 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
14 Shurman v. Fresno Ice Rink, Inc., 91 Cal. App. 2d 469, 205 P. 2d 77
(1949); Tite v. Omaha Coliseum Corporation et al., 144 Neb. 22, 12 N. W.
(1943).
2d 90
15 M odec v. City of Eveleth, 224 Minn. 556, 29 N. W. 2d 453 (1947).
6
1 Sce Grimes v. American League Baseball Co., 78 S. W. 2d 520, 523 (Mo.
1935).
127Query: Recognizing the recent popularization of wrestling by television,
should the possibility of a wrestler being thrown out of the ring be any less
a matter of common knowledge than that of a baseball being fouled into the
stands ?

